Corruption is a highly political phenomenon because a range of corrupt acts may be politicised. This happens when the spoils of corruption are sought and reinvested, not for personal enrichment, but to maintain and enhance a corrupt leader’s hold on power. This basic guide explains how a range of corrupt acts may be politicised and the implications for anti-corruption efforts.

The politicisation process

When corruption is politicised, corrupt acts are used to extract resources from the public coffers, which are then reinvested in the structures, networks and tactics that politicians use to maintain and extend their hold on power. A book chapter by Inge Amundsen, describes these interdependent dynamics of extraction and power preservation.

Extraction

The most common forms of corruption used to extract resources from the economy and the population are:

• Soliciting bribes (money or favours) paid to a political power-holder (in person, or to their family members, organisation or the ruling party), normally by national and international companies or private individuals. In exchange, the bribe-payers get access to eg natural resources, concessions, state contracts, or privileges such as monopolies.
• Embezzlement is the theft or misappropriation of state assets (funds, property and services) by someone in authority in a public institution.
• Fraud is when power-holders either play an active role in concealing or intentionally misrepresenting facts (including their own involvement), or take a share of payment or reward for ‘closing their eyes’ on economic crimes.
• Extortion is the use of force, threats, harassment, or persistent demands to extract money or other resources from individuals, groups and businesses.

Power preservation

It is easier to stay in power when your opponents are diminished and your ranks of supporters swollen. When accountability is weaker, you can subvert the democratic institutional checks and balances. Power-preserving corruption seeks to achieve this through:

• Buying friends and the opposition.This includes some well-known tactics such as favouritism (or nepotism), patronage, and cronyism.
• Buying elections can mean bribing the electoral commission and high court to give favourable decisions. Vote buying or ‘handouts’ is also a common practice in many countries.
• Buying impunity from judges, courts, auditors general, or anti-corruption agency commissioners is another tactic.

The role of networks

Not all corrupt acts are part of this extraction–power-preservation dynamic. Bribes paid to avoid traffic fines or to access administrative documents can remain for private gain and there is no reinvestment of those resources in power preservation.

Corruption that is within networks, however, is often politicised. Networks can involve key players – such as politicians, government ministers, senior civil servants, and other elected, nominated or appointed senior public office holders. Yet, some of the most powerful ‘political’ actors may not even be elected – they could be businesspeople, military leaders, senior bureaucrats, or figures from organised crime.

These networks comprise what the Democracy in Africa coalition describe as shadow states. Sarah Chayes has analysed these structures of corruption in more detail, looking closely at how corrupt political networks span the political and private sectors. A U4 study applied social network analysis to map a corrupt network in Pelalawan in Indonesia and showed how forestry corruption networks are remarkably broad and far-reaching.

The organisation of politicised corruption can also span national boundaries. Political corruption in one state can be facilitated by professional enablers within international banking, consultancy companies, and law firms. In certain cases, corporations, banks, and intelligence agencies operating from the Global North have been at the apex of structured corruption. Corrupt elites can also be strengthened by the flow of development aid from external donors.

The systemic consequences

This trap can lead to far-reaching consequences for political systems. One U4 study that draws on research from Bolivia and Mozambique describes how the abuse of state resources for re-election damages democracy. It can also encourage systemic institutional decay where the legislature, administration, and judiciary become subordinate to the interests of political elites, and therefore are unable to fight corruption.

Ultimately, it can lead to the suppression of democratic institutions. The U4 publication Rethinking anti-corruption in de-democratising regimes demonstrates how corruption is an important part of the toolbox for would-be autocrats in their pursuit of unchecked power.

The politicisation of anti-corruption

The flip side of corruption being politicised is that anti-corruption is also political, even though it is often presented as an endeavour distanced from local or global political processes. Interventions that aim to reduce corruption can be politicised in different ways, leading to unintended or counterproductive outcomes.

Political counterattack

As anti-corruption efforts advance, the ruling elites who use corruption to preserve power will start thinking about how to break free from those constraints. The response will depend on their power and position and the techniques available to them. Powerful actors may be subtle, using their official position to obstruct anti-corruption efforts through inaction or disruption, perhaps at the same time as rhetorically championing those same efforts. Political actors can deploy 'roadblocks' to reform, ranging from simply not turning up to meetings, to publicly denouncing reform interventions as politically motivated.

Corrupt politicians will defend their vital interests vehemently, and sometimes violently. Extralegal manipulation beyond the law can also be part of the response. Journalists and campaigners are particularly vulnerable. A U4 note on Managing a hostile court environment describes how judges and other legal professions have been attacked.

Weaponising anti-corruption

As well as tactics of inaction, disruption, and violent resistance, corrupt political actors can also hijack and weaponise the anti-corruption agenda and efforts. Anti-corruption commissions and special corruption courts, along with tax authorities, the police, courts and other institutions, can be turned into a weapon for private interests. In Rwanda, after she announced her candidacy for president in 2017, political activist Diane Rwigara was disqualified from the election and detained – along with her mother and sister – for alleged tax evasion.

When used in this way, anti-corruption efforts can backfire. The U4 Report on artificial intelligence outlines the risk of new surveillance technology being used as a tool for control, rather than to predict or reveal misconduct or power abuses. This U4 political economy analysis of Cambodia suggests that recent anti-corruption reforms have been critical to consolidating power in the hands of the ruling Cambodian People’s Party.

International interests politicising the ‘fight’ against corruption

International development cooperation is not isolated from economic, security and geopolitical concerns. Anti-corruption efforts are restrained by, and can be overruled by, political, security and economic interests of donor country governments. This can include implicit support for corrupt ruling elites in partner countries.